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Abstract—The successful deployment of safe and trustworthy
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) will highly depend
on the ability to devise robust and effective security solutions
to resist sophisticated cyber attacks and patch up critical vul-
nerabilities. Pseudonym Public Key Infrastructure (PPKI) is a
promising approach to secure vehicular networks as well as
ensure data and location privacy, concealing the vehicles’ real
identities. Nevertheless, pseudonym distribution and management
affect PPKI scalability due to the significant number of digital
certificates required by a single vehicle. In this paper, we focus
on the certificate revocation process and propose a versatile and
low-complexity framework to facilitate the distribution of the
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) issued by the Certification
Authority (CA). CRL compression is achieved through optimized
Bloom filters, which guarantee a considerable overhead reduction
with a configurable rate of false positives. Our results show that
the distribution of compressed CRLs can significantly enhance
the system scalability without increasing the complexity of the
revocation process.
Index Terms—ITS, PPKI, vehicular networks, certificate revo-
cation, Bloom filter, autonomous vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) rely heavily
upon a wide spectrum of heterogeneous technologies com-
bining autonomous driving and vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
communications, with the goal of achieving social and eco-
nomic benefits, such as enhanced road safety, reduced traffic
congestion and air pollution [1]. Besides innovative emergency
services and infotainment applications leveraging Global Posi-
tioning Systems (GPS) and cellular systems, Dedicated Short
Range Communications (DSRC) connectivity allows vehicles
to exchange real-time information provided by on-board sen-
sor devices, and make decisions based on multiple factors,
including road conditions and traffic status [2].
One of the most critical issues concerning the deployment
of such vehicular networks is how to efficiently integrate
cyber security mechanisms, and ensure trustworthiness and
anonymity of exchanged data. Due to the their intrinsic char-
acteristics, V2X communications can be targeted by numerous
cyber attacks and security threats, ranging from injection
of bogus information or node impersonation, to malicious
location tracking and privacy leakage [3]. As a result, security
for CAVs has been subject of intensive joint research activities
among automotive industry, standardization and regulatory
bodies, public authorities and academia, resulting in a plethora
of research projects and initiatives across the world [4].
As part of the IEEE 1609 Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (WAVE) suite, IEEE 1609.2 represents the ref-
erence standard for security and privacy adopting a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), where vehicle authentication is achieved
through a Certification Authority (CA) or Trusted Third Party
(TPP), in charge of issuing legitimate digital certificates and
binding vehicle identity to its public key [5]. An authenti-
cated vehicle can then use its corresponding private key to
digitally sign each outgoing packet, whereas sender identity
verification is performed by using the public key included
in the certificate assigned by the CA. Moreover, the CA is
responsible for revoking certificates associated with corrupted
or misbehaving entities. To this end, IEEE 1609.2 defines
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) containing the identities
of the revoked certificates, which are periodically updated and
disseminated by the CA in the vehicular network [6]. Upon the
reception of a new message, a vehicle can identify a legitimate
sender by verifying whether the corresponding certificate is not
published in the CRL.
To further preserve data privacy and limit vehicle traceabil-
ity, vehicle identities (VIDs) can be replaced with multiple
abstract short-lived identifiers, i.e., pseudonyms, thus realizing
a Pseudonym PKI (PPKI) [7]. The pseudonym credentials are
issued by the CA, which is also responsible for verifying
the eligibility of a vehicle to exchange data by storing its
VID. Therefore, location privacy is preserved, as two con-
secutive messages are signed under two distinct and unlikable
pseudonyms. However, this comes at the price of a significant
increase in the CRL size, which in turn undermines the
scalability and efficiency of the revocation process [8].
In this paper, we propose a low-complexity framework for
ensuring trustworthy communications, aiming to reduce the
overhead of the CRL distribution via optimized Bloom filter
compression. Authors in [6] first adopt Bloom filters to com-
press the CRLs and reduce the amount of data disseminated.
The resulting Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (C2RL)
are then broadcast, while certificate validation is quickly
performed by checking the Bloom filter associated with the
latest C2RL update. Similarly, [9] proposes the Revocation
using C2RL (RC2RL) protocol, where the dissemination of
compressed lists is achieved through Road Side Units (RSU)
and mobile units. In addition, a quantitative analysis of the
protocol performance is presented, showing the existing trade-
off between computational complexity and probability of false
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positives. Bloom filter compression is also employed in [10],
where vehicles locally compress and store the list of revoked
certificates by generating the revocation keys with the help of
optimized CRLs, which are disseminated in a V2V epidemic
fashion. However, these solutions do not specify optimal val-
ues of the parameters associated with Bloom filters and do not
consider the case of multiple certificates assigned to a single
vehicle. Differently from the proposed approaches, we aim to
evaluate the efficiency of C2RLs in PPKI vehicular networks,
and introduce an optimization framework to jointly minimize
the filter size and the number of hash functions employed,
according to a predefined probability of false positives. Our
results show that the CRL distribution process can benefit from
the significant overhead reduction, which can be characterized
through the compression gain, without causing an increase in
complexity. We also demonstrate the C2RLs effectiveness in
comparison with a standard CRL approach in an urban setting
through large-scale network simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the network model adopted as well as the certificate
compression and the CRL distribution. The proposed optimiza-
tion framework is illustrated in Section III. In Section IV,
we analyze the numerical results obtained, whereas the final
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the vehicular network and the
main entities involved in our system model. We also discuss
the fundamental aspects of the C2RL issuance and distribution
as well as the procedure to compress the certificates and
perform the verification.
A. Network Model
In a typical hierarchical PPKI setup, a Root CA (RCA)
coordinates the CAV authentication within a predefined juris-
dictional area, such as a city, region, county, etc., by registering
vehicles and assigning long-term certificates. Fig. 1 shows
the reference scenario considered in this paper. A certain
number of Pseudonym CAs (PCA) are also connected to the
RCA through wired links, and are responsible for issuing
pseudonyms and CRLs. We assume that RCA and PCAs
are equipped with sufficient resources in terms of storage
and computation, and cannot be compromised by potential
attackers. Moreover, the RCA maintains the mapping of short-
term credentials to the long-term identity of the vehicles. A
number of Road-Side Units (RSU) are deployed along the
roads, each connected to a single PCA via a wired backhaul
network, while V2I wireless connectivity is achieved by em-
ploying DSRC interfaces, such as IEEE 802.11p or ETSI ITS-
G5. To mitigate the potential lack of DSRC due to the RSU
sparse deployment, we also assume that CAVs are supplied
with a cellular radio interface, e.g., 3GPP LTE-A. Although
cellular systems introduce additional delay and present limited
applicability for safety critical applications, we expect that
the integration of these two technologies will represent a key
feature of next-generation V2X communications [11]. CAVs
Root
CA
PCAA
PCAB
DSRC 
RSU
Fig. 1. Illustration of the system model, where two PCAs are connected to
a single RCA.
sign and broadcast safety-related messages, i.e., Cooperative
Awareness Messages (CAM) and Decentralized Environmental
Notification Messages (DENM), attaching the sender cer-
tificate, and are provided with a tamper-resistant Hardware
Security Module (HSM) storing the cryptographic material.
B. Attacker Model
We assume that an internal adversary is able to inject bogus
information in terms of fake messages through a legitimate
private/public key pair and a related pseudonym certificate. An
attacker may also perform a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
by broadcasting messages with the goal of reducing network
resources necessary to reliably exchange safety messages.
We assume that anomaly detection algorithms are capable of
identifying these threats and triggering the eviction process.
C. Certificate Compression
Following the PPKI approach [12], we assume that each
vehicle is assigned a certain number of short-term certificates
containing different pseudonyms and pairs of public/private
keys. In passive revocation schemes [13], the pseudonym
certificate lifetime is minimized, thus vehicles and PCAs need
to frequently communicate to initiate the certificate renewal
or pseudonym refill procedure. This requirement is usually
dictated by the need for minimizing the vulnerability window,
i.e., the time between a vehicle is declared illegitimate and
subsequent pseudonym refill requests are denied, and all the
associated pseudonyms are expired. By contrast, our approach
seeks to limit the frequency of pseudonym refills according to
the pseudonym change strategy adopted and the storage capa-
bility1. Efficient compression of CRLs can be accomplished
with the help of Bloom filters. A Bloom filter is a probabilistic
data structure typically adopted to verify whether a certain
element belongs to a set [14]. Such a filter is characterized
by a probability of false positives, i.e., probability that an
1The problem of how to efficiently change the pseudonyms and determine
the change rate is out of the scope of this paper.
0 0 0 0 011 . . . 01
H1(x) H2(x) Hk(x)
0 1 2 m-1m-2m-3
Element x
. . .
3 4 5
Fig. 2. Example of Bloom filter of size m bits and k hash functions.
element not included in the set is detected due to multiple
hash collisions, while false negatives cannot occur. As shown
in Fig. 2, a Bloom filter corresponds to a sequence of m
bits set to 0. To add an element x, a set of k independent
hash functions H1, . . . ,Hk are employed. The output of each
hash function matches one of the filter elements and sets
to 1 the corresponding bit, while an element previously set
to 1 cannot be altered. The verification procedure is then
performed by checking the bits corresponding to the output
of the hash functions. If all the corresponding bits are set to
1, an element is assumed to be contained in the filter with a
certain probability, whereas negative outcomes are always true
if at least one of the filter bits is 0. For a target number of
filter elements m, the probability of false positives δ is given
by [14]:
δ(m, k)
.
=
[
1−
(
1− 1
m
)kn]k
, (1)
being n the number of elements to add into the filter. Hence,
the filter accuracy is influenced by the size, the number of em-
ployed hash functions and n, as the larger the set of elements,
the higher the probability of obtaining a false positive. More-
over, Bloom filters involve a small amount of computational
overhead for insertion and search operations [10].
D. CRL Issuance and Distribution
Every time a misbehaving vehicle is identified, a new CRL
needs to be issued and sent to the registered CAVs. As a
result, all non-expired certificates associated with the evicted
vehicle must be revoked, otherwise any pseudonym still valid
may be used to sign the outgoing traffic2. We also assume
that a revocation authority, e.g., a government agency, is in
charge of recognizing malicious vehicles and informing the
RCA. As shown in Fig. 3, a WAVE CRL consists of (i)
a header, including a version field set to 1, a signer field
containing information on the CA issuing and signing the
CRL, and a signature field carrying the signature of the signer,
and (ii) the unsigned CRL field. A detailed description of
each sub-field is reported in [5]. To discuss the differences
between a standard CRL (see Fig. 3(A)) and a Bloom filter
compressed CRL (see Fig. 3(B)), we focus on the entries sub-
field, containing the identifiers of each revoked certificate.
Specifically, in a standard WAVE CRL, each certificate is
2This assumption entails linkability among pseudonyms, which limits data
privacy. The analysis of the tradeoff between overhead and privacy is left for
future work.
version signer unsigned CRL signature
type CRL series CA ID
CRL 
serial
start 
period
issue 
date
next 
CRL entries
1 byte 136 bytes
1 byte 4 bytes 8 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes
ID expiry date
10 bytes 4 bytes
64 bytes
ID expiry date
10 bytes 4 bytes
Bloom filter
?m/8? bytes
(A) (B)
Fig. 3. Structure of a WAVE CRL [5]: standard CRL (A) and C2RL (B).
identified with an ID field and an optional expiry date field,
used to enhance the efficiency of the certificate storage. By
contrast, in our approach, a single Bloom filter of fixed size
m bits is carried by the entries field. As a consequence, the
size of this field remains constant as the number of revoked
certificates increases, thus resulting in a significant reduction
of the size of the CRLs distributed to the CAVs, as illustrated
in Sec. IV. We assume that a C2RL is issued by the RCA
and delivered to its connected PCAs. Next, the RSUs receive
the C2RL forwarded by the PCAs and validate the attached
signature. The C2RL is then signed by the RSU and broadcast
to the CAVs through DSRC connectivity, which verify the
authenticity and store it in the HSM. Hence, untrustworthy
vehicles can be quickly identified by verifying whether the
certificates attached in the messages are contained in the
filter transmitted in the latest C2RL. We also point out that
only the parameter k needs to be notified to the CAVs in
order to fulfill this process, as long as each CAV adopts the
same implementation for the k uniformly distributed hashing
functions employed. To this end, we consider a single hashing
function and provide it with different seed values3.
Being the generation of false positives inevitable, how
to handle vehicle identities wrongly revoked represents an
open research question. To overcome this issue, we adopt the
approach proposed in [10] and provide the vehicles with a set
of backup pseudonyms to replace those pseudonyms generating
false positives. Each vehicle periodically establishes whether
the pseudonym in use triggers a false positive. In other words,
each vehicle validates the pseudonym in use against the
latest CRL update. Should a legitimate vehicle trigger a false
positive, the pseudonym in use is replaced with one of the
backup pseudonyms. This entails the provision of additional
certificates to compensate for the number of pseudonyms
discarded because of false positives. It is worth noting that the
resulting false positive probability decreases exponentially as
the number of backup pseudonyms per-vehicle increases [10].
III. PROPOSED OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK
Let S = {k1, ..., kn} be the set of certificates to be added
into the Bloom filter, being |S| = n the cardinality of S. We
formulate our filter optimization (FO) model as follows4:
3In our implementation, the i-th hashing function is simply obtained by
setting the corresponding seed value to i.
4By N we denote the set of natural numbers.
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Fig. 4. Contour plot of δ(m, k), for n = 102. We only reported the
level curves corresponding to the pairs (m, k) where δ(m, k) is equal to
0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2.
(FO) min
m,k
m (2)
subject to δ(m, k) ≤ δˆ (3)
k ≥ 1, m ≥ 1 (4)
m ∈ N, k ∈ N. (5)
We observe that the FO model carries out a joint optimization
of m and k, having as objective the minimization of m, as
per (2). Constraint (3) ensures that the probability of false
positives is smaller than or equal to a target value δˆ. Obviously,
in order for a Bloom filter to exist, it should be at least one
bit long and be associated with at least one hash function.
These existing constraints are summarized in (4). Finally,
constraint (5) imposes m and k to be integer values.
In the attempt of solving the FO model, we re-
lax constraint (5). In addition, we regard the function
δ˜(m˜, k˜) : R+ × R+ → [0, 1] as the real expansion of δ(m, k)
over the set of positive real values R+. As such, the relaxed
FO (rFO) model can be expressed as follows:
(rFO) argmin
m˜,k˜
{
m˜
∣∣∣ δ˜(m˜, k˜) ≤ δˆ ∧ k ≥ 1 ∧m ≥ 1}. (6)
Remark 3.1: From (1), it follows that δ(m, k) goes to 0 as
m tends to infinity, which is not surprising (see Section II-C).
Furthermore, from (1), we observe that as m increases,
δ(m, k) cannot increase. Hence, considering constraint (3), the
more δ(m, k) approaches δˆ, the more m is likely to decrease,
as also shown in Fig. 4. Obviously, the same observation also
applies to δ˜(m˜, k˜).
For a given value of δˆ, we define the function m˜(k˜)
providing the value of m˜ such that relation δ˜(m˜(k˜), k˜) = δˆ
holds. From (1), m˜(k˜) can be defined as follows:
m˜(k˜)
.
=
[
1−
(
1− δˆ− 1k˜
) 1
k˜n
]−1
. (7)
We denote by (m˜∗, k˜∗) the optimum solution of rFO. From
Remark 3.1, we observe that the optimum solution of rFO
shall satisfy condition δ˜(m˜∗, k˜∗) = δˆ. As such, the value of
k˜∗ can be defined as follows:
k˜∗ = argmin
k˜
{
m˜(k˜)
}
, (8)
Procedure 1 Solution of FO
1: k˜∗ ← the real root of (11)
2: m˜∗ ← m˜(k˜∗)
3: i← 1
4: for k ← bk˜∗c, dk˜∗e do
5: k(i)← k
6: m(i)← bm˜∗c
7: while δ(m(i),k(i)) > δˆ do
8: m(i)←m(i) + 1
9: i← i+ 1
10: for i← 1, 2 do
11: if δ(m(i),k(i)) > δˆ then
12: m(i)← NaN
13: k(i)← NaN
14: if m(1) 6=m(2) then
15: j ← index of the smallest element in m
16: else
17: j ← index of the smallest element in k
18: return (m(j),k(j))
while m˜∗ is simply equal to m˜(k˜∗).
From (7), we derive the first order derivative of m˜(k˜), which
is [15]:
∂m˜
∂k˜
=
T
1
k˜n
(1− T 1k˜n )2
[
δˆ
1
k˜ log(δˆ)
k˜3nT
− log(T )
k˜2n
]
, (9)
where
T
.
= 1− δˆ 1k˜ . (10)
We observe that the equation ∂m˜
∂k˜
= 0 has at least a real root
iff the equation
δˆ
1
k˜ log(δˆ)− k˜T log(T ) = 0 (11)
has at least a real root, as well. By resorting to the bisection
strategy [16], it is numerically simple to observe that this
circumstance occurs for practical values of m˜, k˜ and δˆ5.
Finally, we observe that the real root of (11), if it exists, is
equal to k˜∗.
From the optimum solution (m˜∗, k˜∗) of rFO, we derive
the optimum solution (m∗, k∗) of FO, as per Procedure 1.
In particular, for each value in vector k = [bk˜∗c, dk˜∗e], the
for-loop at lines 4-9 and 10-13 (of Procedure 1) derives the
minimum filter length that meets constraint (3). These values
are then stored in vector m. Lines 14-17 allow the procedure
to select the solution associated with the smallest filter size or,
if both the solutions refer to the same filter size, the procedure
returns the one with the smallest number of hash functions.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the performance in terms of
overhead reduction obtained by employing our optimized
framework. To this end, we denote by G the compression gain,
5Specifically, we refer to m˜ ∈ [1, 232], k˜ ∈ [1, 103] and
δˆ ∈ [10−4, 2 · 10−1].
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS CONSIDERED IN THE HOLLOWAY SCENARIO.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Area size 3km × 2km Max. UDP packet
size
1024 bits
Sim. duration 3600 s Carrier freq. 5.89GHz
SUMO through
traffic factor [17]
7 TX power 20mW
SUMO traffic
count [17]
15 Phy. layer bitrate 11Mbps
No. pseudonyms
per-vehicle
1000 Sensitivity −89dBm
CRL TX interval 300 s Thermal noise −110dB
Optimized Bloom
filter
δˆ = 10−3, n = 300
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3
4
5
6
7
8
Fig. 5. Optimal number of hash functions k∗ for different values of n and
δˆ.
corresponding to the ratio between the size of a standard CRL
and the size of a C2RL adopting the Bloom filter compression.
As described in Sec. II-D, a standard CRL consists of a
fixed section of 230 bytes and an additional 14 bytes per
each revoked certificate, whereas the size of a CCRL is equal
to 230 + dm/8e bytes. Finally, we consider a large-scale
urban scenario and evaluate the C2RL gains through network
simulations.
A. Optimal Values of k and m
Fig. 5 shows the optimal number of hash functions k∗ for
different values of δˆ and varying input load n. As expected,
a less strict requirement in terms of false positives leads to
a lower and constant k∗ as the number of certificates to be
compressed becomes higher. On the other hand, by decreasing
δˆ we observe an increment of the optimal number of hash
functions, which is necessary to reduce the probability of false
positive reports. In addition, Fig. 6 shows the optimal filter size
m∗ (in bits) to meet different values of δˆ as a function of n.
We note that m∗ linearly increases as the input load becomes
higher, thus allowing to keep the false positive rate less than
or equal to δˆ. Furthermore, the filter size increase becomes
more relevant for δˆ = 10−2, as shown by the gap between
the blue and green line. This in turn indicates the amount of
space required in the filter to prevent multiple hash collisions.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Fig. 6. Optimal filter size m∗ for different values of n and δˆ.
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Fig. 7. Compression gain as δˆ increases and for different values of n.
B. C2RL v.s. Standard CRL
Fig. 7 shows the compression gain G as δˆ increases and
for different numbers of certificates revoked n. We can note
the key benefit provided by the CRL compression, consisting
in a significant reduction of the overhead generated by the
revocation process. It is also worth pointing out that for low
values of n the gain is constant, as the probability of false
positives does not significantly influence the choice of the
optimal m. By contrast, for higher loads, e.g., n = 103, we
observe that G increases from 7 to 9, which shows the effi-
ciency of Bloom filters for storing high amounts of certificates
as compared with standard CRLs. To analyze the performance
of the optimized CRL distribution, we also consider an urban
vehicular scenario, where vehicles are distributed on an area of
5 km2 with different spatial densities, i.e., number of vehicles
per km2, managed by a single PCA. Furthermore, we assume
that each vehicle owns a set of 43800 certificates, which
corresponds to the fixed amount of certificates requested by a
vehicle driving for two hours and every day of the year [18].
Moreover, we define the revocation rate ρ, representing the
percentage of vehicles per hour whose certificates must be
revoked. Fig. 8 shows the average compression gain over
an hour, for different values of ρ as the vehicle density
increases, and fixed δˆ = 10−3. We note that for ρ = 0.1%,
G considerably increases in the range of densities between
20 and 40, whereas a saturation effect occurs for values of
density higher than 60 vehicles per km2. This is more evident
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
7.5
7.55
7.6
7.65
7.7
7.75
7.8
 = 0.1%
 = 0.5%
 = 1%
Fig. 8. Compression gain as the vehicle density increases and for different
values of ρ (δˆ = 10−3).
Fig. 9. Map of the simulated area in Holloway (London, UK). The figure
shows the footprint of the main buildings present in the area and a possible
RSU deployment.
for ρ equal to 0.5% and 1%, where the compression gain
immediately reaches a saturation level around 7.78. In other
words, for higher values of ρ the filter size needs to increase
to meet the δˆ constraint, while m∗ remains low for lower
revocation rates.
C. Large-Scale Urban Scenario
To further evaluate the performance gain of the C2RL
scheme over the standard CRL performance, we implemented
the aforementioned revocation schemes in a OMNet++ net-
work simulator based on the Veins framework [19]. We
considered the urban area of Holloway (London, UK) where
a realistic traffic of vehicles has been simulated by means
of SUMO [17]. Each vehicle is equipped with a DSRC
communication device capable of communicating with RSUs
deployed at the side of the road. In order to investigate
the impact of different RSU deployments, we placed RSUs
uniformly at random in the simulated area preventing the RSUs
from being placed within the footprint of a building, as shown
in Fig. 9. In particular, we considered scenarios ranging from
28 to 139 RSUs. Periodically, the CA generates a CRL, which
is fragmented by the RSUs, encapsulated in UDP packets and
transmitted over the DSRC interface. A list of the relevant
simulation parameters is reported in Tab. I.
28 40 60 80 100 120 139
Number of RSUs
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
G
ai
n
50 revoked identities - #CRLs received
100 revoked identities - #CRLs received
50 revoked identities - fraction of vehicles receiving at least a CRL
100 revoked identities - fraction of vehicles receiving at least a CRL
50 revoked identities - CRL download time
100 revoked identities - CRL download time
Fig. 10. Gains in terms of CRL delivery ratio, percentage of vehicles
successfully receiving a CRL and CRL download time.
Fig. 10 shows the gains achieved employing the C2RL
scheme over a standard CRL approach in terms of total number
of CRLs received by all the vehicles, fraction of vehicles
receiving at least one CRL, and average CRL download time as
a function of the number of RSUs. The derived performance
values have been averaged over multiple instances of RSU
deployments. We simulated the cases where 50 or 100 vehicles
identities per-hours are revoked and each vehicle holds 1000
pseudonyms. We observe that, in the case of the C2RL
scheme, the Bloom filter parameters m and k have been
optimized as in Sec. III, by referring to δˆ = 10−3 and a value
of n equal to the average number of vehicles present in the
simulated area per-second. We note that a higher number of
RSUs per-area ensure higher gains for 100 revoked vehicle
identities both in terms of the total number of CRLs received
by all the vehicles and the fraction of vehicles receiving at
least one CRL - thus ensuring, in the case of 139 RSUs, gains
greater than 1.55 and 1.6, respectively. These effects are also
detectable for 50 revoked identities per-hours, yet limited due
to the lower traffic load. From Fig. 10, we also observe that
C2RL guarantees a shorter CRL download time resulting in
an average CRL download time gain greater than 2.5, for 139
RSUs and 100 identities revoked per-hour.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an optimized framework to
streamline the certificate revocation distribution in a PPKI-
based vehicular network. We illustrated the scalability issue
resulting from the adoption of a large set of pseudonym
certificates per each CAV and discussed the benefits of CRL
compression through Bloom filters. Significant compression
gains can be achieved by adding revoked certificates into a
Bloom filter and then disseminating the C2RL in the network.
We also investigated the impact of different input loads and
false positive rates on the optimal choice of k and m, and
compared our approach with a standard CRL distribution
scheme in a realistic large-scale scenario.
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